Saturday, September 19, 2009

You Might Want to Sit Down for this…

I’ve been pondering a way to break the proverbial ice locking in my little corner of the internet. Sure I could’ve posted about my internship or how the Forcier is with Michigan [sic] at last or my extreme discomfort when the Metro train shrieks like a banshee when going fast through dark tunnels, but that would be the same self-centered drivel I usually shovel onto the pile. It just so happens that a more noble and interesting topic found its way to me this week.

First some background information is required. As some may not yet know, I am now living in Alexandria, VA and I have an interesting job, with fantastic hours, but the financial compensation leaves much to be desired. I work as an intern at the National Security Archive at George Washington University in downtown DC. My boss is a research professor who works for the archive on a number of projects dealing with the history of nuclear weapons. I will admit that the topic of nuclear weapons policy is a morbid one and the more I read about it – it becomes a sordid subject. Nevertheless, I am always intrigued by the policy making process regarding nuclear weapons and its evolution throughout the Cold War.

I get to do all kinds of cool things like submitting Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to government agencies and digging through the National Archives for relevant documents (often for the purpose of sending more FOIA requests). Like any job, there are some downsides. For one, the intern room also serves as a storage room and the intern chairs are uncomfortable. So I lack some creature comforts, the real downside is what I ran across this week: too much information.

One of the things I get to do is sift through excessively redacted government documents and try to find out what was excised. The best way to go about this is going through relevant published academic books and papers and, occasionally, other government documents. Very rarely do you come across something from 1945-1985 that is truly classified. Most weapons systems and diplomatic relationship have changed dramatically since then and full disclosure is hardly a threat to national security. So I was going through a batch of documents this week that were really tough cases. They were heavily redacted and fairly obscure.

One particular document was a 1971 hypothetical timeline of a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The timeline assumed a Soviet first strike, but it was oddly different from the typical timelines. Most civilian and military policy analysts agree (and plan) that a first strike would be opened with strikes from submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). SLBMs can best take advantage of the element of surprise since detection of launches is usually too late to mitigate damage. Most modern estimates predict that coastal command and control centers (a.k.a. Washington, D.C.) would have less than 15 minutes warning. More significantly, SLBMs also would be responsible for setting off EMP (Electromagnetic Pulse) blasts that would disable most of the power grid. Strangely, the 1971 timeline excluded this element.

Anyway, this timeline was missing the timeframes (easy to find information, pointlessly redacted), moment-by-moment casualty estimates (pure speculation, but final estimates are also easy to find) and certain weapon systems (most prominent or secret 1971 weapons systems are mainstream or decommissioned today). While I was digging around for some answers I came across a report issued by the Office of Technology Assessment in response to a request from Congress for an assessment of the effects of a nuclear war. The report is aptly titled “The Effects of Nuclear War”. Usually when I read stuff like this, I’m able to stay pretty unemotional, but this one just hit me like a truck. It is a slightly long-ish read, so if you want the stuff that inspired me to write, read pages 15-39 and Appendix C. The whole thing is very well written and downright sobering.

Using Detroit as a case study was a bolt out of the blue and definitely hit close to home. Since most of the readers here have some familiarity with Detroit, I felt the urge to share. The cold discussion of the effects produced by varying the altitude and yield really hurts when dealing with a place that you know. The story in Appendix C is also a great read. It reminded me of The Road, minus the disturbing imagery.

Speaking of The Road, I really enjoyed the book, but I don’t know if I can go see the movie this fall. The imagery in the book was really intense and downright unsettling. I don’t know if I could handle that kind of stuff in a movie. Still, I think The Road is a great book to transfer onto film.

Fortunately, a lot has changed since that 1979 report came out. The chance of an all-out nuclear war is pretty slim for the foreseeable future. The U.S. has an administration that has shown limited interest in pursuing new nuclear weapons and is dedicated to stabilizing diplomatic relations with countries that possess large nuclear arsenals (thanks Kevin!).

Edit: I apologize for the hideous text formatting. My html knowledge is very basic and I guess trying to use a real word processor to write an 840 word blog post is a terrible idea. I doubt I will find the patience to fix this, hopefully the content makes up for the disheveled appearance.

8 comments:

Alb said...

Thanks for sharing. :)

It's been a long time since I've posted anything. >.> I've been too busy cutting up dead people (at least he won't be a zombie, we scooped out his brain this Wednesday).

I'll try to read that snippet you suggest, might be interesting. I hope everything's going well with ya!!

Jackson said...

No no Alb, scooping out his brain *makes* him a zombie. Hence the wandering in search of "braaiinnnsss...."

Alb said...

Evidently I was wrong. However, don't you have to head shot zombies to destroy them, thus indicating that they must have some kind of brain-like structure? Perhaps they need a fresh supply of brains to replace their ever-deteriorating ones. o_O

Dan Jenkins said...

That's why the zombies in the latest Resident Evil games are not zombies. They have brains (or two? I don't know enough about the epidemiology of Plagas) and do not hunger for more brains. Furthermore, the shotgun head shot is not always RE zombie anathema. Indeed, often the result of a kinetic decapitation is replacing the stupid brain-filled head with something far less appealing.

Alb said...

Hmm, my zombie source was "The Zombie Survival Guide" by Max Brooks. Great book, btw. For close combat get a trench spike.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zombie_Survival_Guide

It seems the "literature" doesn't quite agree on the presence/absence of zombie brains.

Jackson said...

Zombie brains aside, that was a pretty chilling read. I'm glad we don't hang under the specter of MAD these days, but after reading that I'm tempted to build a fallout shelter just in case...

Kevin said...

It's incredible to read information on our government's contingencies that were in place for the event of a nuclear strike. I can't remember at the moment, but I know I've read some crazy histories on some of the things the government had up its sleeve to strike back at the Soviet Union I shall have to look.

p.s. watch out for Zombie Shakespeare and Zombie Einstein eeee

Dan Jenkins said...

Fortunately, MAD was usually looked down upon by most nuclear strategists as an ineffective way to win a nuclear war. Both US and Soviet decision-makers used MAD as a deterrent against major strikes against population centers and focused actual war plans on counter-force and limited strikes against industry and other military/leadership targets.

Granted, industrial and leadership targets often lie within or adjacent to population centers, but no one actually planned on initiating a nuclear exchange by targeting cities for the sake of casualties.

The notion of winning a nuclear war is a bit silly, but it was given a lot of thought by both sides. A lot of people credit our existence today with the deterring presence of MAD doctrine, but MAD was always the last resort in a nuclear exchange.