Cleaning House

In 1972, Richard Nixon was re-elected for a second term as President. Of course, the political exploits of that administration are well-known to those with even a basic knowledge of 20th century American history. The Watergate scandal stole headlines, and rightly so, but a different variety of political subterfuge was also underway in the final months of 1972.

In May of 1972, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed an interim agreement with respect to strategic arms limitations which was the culmination of SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks). In November of 1972, the-powers-that-be decided that a change was needed (warning: links to a small pdf file). A quick dramatis personae: Henry = Henry Kissinger (National Security Advisor), Scoop Jackson = Senator Henry Jackson D-WA, Al Haig = Alexander Haig (Kissinger's military assistant and Army Vice Chief of Staff), others mentioned are either those in line for the figurative guillotine or their replacements. It's worth mentioning that the attachment mentioned in the memorandum is indeed not present and thus bait for speculation.

The Administration went ahead with a full-scale purge of the ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) and the SALT negotiating team. Naturally, this move was the cause of some concern (warning: another pdf file, a bit bigger this time) among those in the arms control community. Paul Doty was a friend of Kissinger's from Harvard and had politically left-wing views.

Ultimately, SALT II was an ill-fated arms control agreement. One can not help but think that a massive purge of the two government bodies primarily responsible for strategic arms control wasn't a helpful development. Even Kissinger would later express some regret over the realignment of the ACDA and SALT team*.

Raymond Garthoff, a member of the SALT negotiating team and victim of the purge, provided an interesting perspective in his memoir, A Journey Through the Cold War:

"Nixon may have had his own reasons for wanting a "new team" in SALT, as Kissinger too may have had. The impetus for the wholesale SALT purge, however, had come from Senator Scoop Jackson. In a private conversation with Jackson in the Rose Garden, Nixon had agreed to replace the SALT delegation with a new team, as he accepted a version of Jackson's amendment on equal strategic force levels in SALT II, in exchange for Jackson's support not only for the SALT agreements but also for the Trident submarine program, which Jackson had threatened to kill. In the final analysis, Jackson got even more: one of the two Trident submarine bases was moved from the Navy's preference for California to Jackson's state of Washington. But the purge of the SALT team and weakening of ACDA were also part of the deal."

Sadly, hunting for documents related to this intriguing Cold War tale is quite difficult. I've spent a number of days sifting through the Nixon Library documents in College Park, Maryland and my boss at the National Security Archive has no doubt performed similar searches and has a number of FOIA requests pending on this matter. Further complicating matters is the fact that the entire Nixon collection is being shipped out to the Nixon Library in California later in February. Demand for Nixon documents is very high right now and I plan to spend more time trying to dig up some new information.

Two of the other big players in this event have archives that are out of my reach. Sen. Henry Jackson has a library of his documents at Washington State University. One of Nixon's assistants, Fred Malek, was heavily involved with this whole affair and has a collection of documents in the Nixon Library, but all of his materials are already in California.

Perhaps the most sobering realization is that documents pertaining to this purge were likely destroyed...

*I would love to link the document, but I foolishly forgot to pick up a copy and I can't access the National Security Archive's digital database from home. This oversight will be corrected on Monday - stay tuned!

Peace through Fear

I am usually a fan of Time magazine. Their stories are typically decent and usually display a sliver of wisdom and enlightenment. Then I read one of their stories today about nuclear weapons and the Nobel Peace Prize. As I mentioned in my last blog post, nuclear policy reading can be downright chilling simply because of the necessity of level-headed discourse. This story completely blind-sided me with its callous ignorance of fact, history and humanity.

Mr. Von Drehle does accurately point out that following World War Two, the number of people killed in conflicts across the world declined sharply. Industrialized warfare, most notably in the First and Second World Wars, produced unprecedented body counts even if you take out those killed in Stalin's purges or the Holocaust. The rise of nuclear weaponry and the bipolar world order of the Cold War created stability through fear.

Though I may disagree with those that characterize Cold War nuclear strategy through the over-simplistic notion of M.A.D. (Mutually Assured Destruction), the consequences of even a limited nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and U.S. would have been nothing short of catastrophic. Plus, the assumptions that damage reports would easily distinguish a limited strike from an urban/industrial strike and that cooler heads would prevail in the midst of a nuclear war are specious, at best. Tens of millions would dead in less than a few hours and more would perish in the following months and years due to radiation exposure, starvation, and the violence that would be created by the collapse of society. Fear of a nuclear holocaust kept the safeties on and the silos sealed.

Imagine, for a moment, that U.S. and British efforts to halt Germany's nuclear program during World War Two had been unsuccessful. Would Hitler and Roosevelt have been able to stay their hands under an existing state of total war? Truman was obviously unable.

What message does one send by suggesting that nuclear weapons are a tool of peace? One legitimizes the repugnant attitudes and ideas of men like Douglas MacArthur and Curtis LeMay and gives credence to people like Commander Eugene Tatom who infamously said, "You could stand in the open at one end of the north-south runway at the Washington National Airport, with no more protection than the clothes you now have on, and have an atom bomb explode at the other end of the runway without serious injury to you."

I also find it immensely disrespectful to the 200,000+ people that died in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 to suggest that nuclear weapons are tools of peace. Are the people who died in the years after 1945 due to cancers caused by atmospheric nuclear tests victims of peace?

In today's mono- trending towards multi-polar world, nuclear weapons are tools of instability. As inheritors of Cold War arsenals, the U.S. and Russia have and must continue to tirelessly strive to disarm and minimize proliferation. Regimes in Iran and North Korea are unsurprisingly interested in nuclear weapons. Iran is sandwiched by heavy concentrations of U.S. ground troops and has an ongoing rivalry with unofficial nuclear state, Israel. North Korea is still technically in a state of war with the U.S. If India and Pakistan were to go to war, what would stop them from using nuclear weapons to preserve their sovereignty.

Many (Mr. Von Drehle included) say that advocates of disarmament are naive to think that a nuclear-free world is possible. Indeed, getting countries like Israel, Pakistan and India to disarm will not come easy. However, I must ask why the U.S. still needs nuclear weapons. Russia is not our enemy anymore nor do they want to be. China's economic ties to the U.S. are too valuable to waste on nuclear rivalry. Were Iran or North Korea to acquire an adequate means of delivering a nuclear strike on the U.S. homeland or military assets, why would they risk the overthrow of their government via the massive conventional retaliation delivered by everyone that hates seeing nuclear weapons used (a.k.a. everyone)? If a terrorist group were to acquire a nuclear device and detonate it in London, Paris, Moscow, Beijing, or New York how could those respective nations respond in kind with their "deterrent"?

If, through some cruel twist of fate, a post-nuclear weapons America needed nuclear weapons again, we have all the pieces we need to build a new nuclear arsenal.

I would rather see President Obama undeservedly win the next 50 Nobel Peace Prizes than see Mr. Von Drehle's irresponsible viewpoint vindicated.

You Might Want to Sit Down for this…

I’ve been pondering a way to break the proverbial ice locking in my little corner of the internet. Sure I could’ve posted about my internship or how the Forcier is with Michigan [sic] at last or my extreme discomfort when the Metro train shrieks like a banshee when going fast through dark tunnels, but that would be the same self-centered drivel I usually shovel onto the pile. It just so happens that a more noble and interesting topic found its way to me this week.

First some background information is required. As some may not yet know, I am now living in Alexandria, VA and I have an interesting job, with fantastic hours, but the financial compensation leaves much to be desired. I work as an intern at the National Security Archive at George Washington University in downtown DC. My boss is a research professor who works for the archive on a number of projects dealing with the history of nuclear weapons. I will admit that the topic of nuclear weapons policy is a morbid one and the more I read about it – it becomes a sordid subject. Nevertheless, I am always intrigued by the policy making process regarding nuclear weapons and its evolution throughout the Cold War.

I get to do all kinds of cool things like submitting Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to government agencies and digging through the National Archives for relevant documents (often for the purpose of sending more FOIA requests). Like any job, there are some downsides. For one, the intern room also serves as a storage room and the intern chairs are uncomfortable. So I lack some creature comforts, the real downside is what I ran across this week: too much information.

One of the things I get to do is sift through excessively redacted government documents and try to find out what was excised. The best way to go about this is going through relevant published academic books and papers and, occasionally, other government documents. Very rarely do you come across something from 1945-1985 that is truly classified. Most weapons systems and diplomatic relationship have changed dramatically since then and full disclosure is hardly a threat to national security. So I was going through a batch of documents this week that were really tough cases. They were heavily redacted and fairly obscure.

One particular document was a 1971 hypothetical timeline of a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the U.S. The timeline assumed a Soviet first strike, but it was oddly different from the typical timelines. Most civilian and military policy analysts agree (and plan) that a first strike would be opened with strikes from submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). SLBMs can best take advantage of the element of surprise since detection of launches is usually too late to mitigate damage. Most modern estimates predict that coastal command and control centers (a.k.a. Washington, D.C.) would have less than 15 minutes warning. More significantly, SLBMs also would be responsible for setting off EMP (Electromagnetic Pulse) blasts that would disable most of the power grid. Strangely, the 1971 timeline excluded this element.

Anyway, this timeline was missing the timeframes (easy to find information, pointlessly redacted), moment-by-moment casualty estimates (pure speculation, but final estimates are also easy to find) and certain weapon systems (most prominent or secret 1971 weapons systems are mainstream or decommissioned today). While I was digging around for some answers I came across a report issued by the Office of Technology Assessment in response to a request from Congress for an assessment of the effects of a nuclear war. The report is aptly titled “The Effects of Nuclear War”. Usually when I read stuff like this, I’m able to stay pretty unemotional, but this one just hit me like a truck. It is a slightly long-ish read, so if you want the stuff that inspired me to write, read pages 15-39 and Appendix C. The whole thing is very well written and downright sobering.

Using Detroit as a case study was a bolt out of the blue and definitely hit close to home. Since most of the readers here have some familiarity with Detroit, I felt the urge to share. The cold discussion of the effects produced by varying the altitude and yield really hurts when dealing with a place that you know. The story in Appendix C is also a great read. It reminded me of The Road, minus the disturbing imagery.

Speaking of The Road, I really enjoyed the book, but I don’t know if I can go see the movie this fall. The imagery in the book was really intense and downright unsettling. I don’t know if I could handle that kind of stuff in a movie. Still, I think The Road is a great book to transfer onto film.

Fortunately, a lot has changed since that 1979 report came out. The chance of an all-out nuclear war is pretty slim for the foreseeable future. The U.S. has an administration that has shown limited interest in pursuing new nuclear weapons and is dedicated to stabilizing diplomatic relations with countries that possess large nuclear arsenals (thanks Kevin!).

Edit: I apologize for the hideous text formatting. My html knowledge is very basic and I guess trying to use a real word processor to write an 840 word blog post is a terrible idea. I doubt I will find the patience to fix this, hopefully the content makes up for the disheveled appearance.